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The purpose of this Comment is to examine some of the
problems in the former procedure law of judgments and to
apprise the reader of the corrective measures and innovations
which the Code of Civil Procedure employs in this area. The
segments of the law of judgments which will be discussed in
this paper may be classified generally as: final judgments; rules
of notice; partial judgments; and imposition of costs.'
FINAL JUDGMENTS
A judgment is final as opposed to interlocutory, when it de-
termines the merits of the dispute, either in whole or in part.2
It must be read and signed in open court3 and must contain
appropriate language by which it may be identified as final.4
The Code of Civil Procedure does not abolish the distinction
between the rendition and signing of judgments.5 This distinc-
tion, which was recognized by some, but not by all, of the articles
in the Code of Practice6 has resulted in uncertainty in determin-
ing the "effective date" of the judgment. 7 The "effective date"
of judgment concept was created by the courts to settle this
apparent conflict between the Code of Practice articles." Fixing
an "effective date" for the judgment has been recognized by
the jurisprudence as critically important in three problem areas:
ascertaining the commencement of procedural delays,9 computing
1. Book II, Title VI, Chapter 3, Articles 1911-1921.
2. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1841 (1960).
3. Id. art. 1911.
4. Id. art. 1918.
5. Id. art. 1911: "... all final judgments shall be read and signed in open
court." (Emphasis added.) See also id. 1911, Comment (a), where it is stated:
"Under the articles in this Chapter, judgments are to be signed at the time of
rendition or at any time thereafter . . . [and] it is contemplated that all judg-
ments will be signed within a reasonable time after rendition."
6. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 543, 546, 547 (1870) clearly indicate that
rendition and signing are distinct judicial acts, while Articles 548, 558, and 565
seem to recognize no such distinction. The jurisprudence, in certain cases, has
held that a judgment is not rendered until signed. See, e.g., Viator v. Heintz, 201
La. 884, 10 So.2d 690 (1942), and the authorities collected therein. For a more
complete discussion of this problem, see Comment, 24 TUL. L. REV. 470 (1950).
7. Since there were some provisions in the Code of Practice which apparently
gave effect to a judgment at the time of rendition, while other articles gave the
judgment effect only upon signing, there was an obvious uncertainty as to which
time, rendition, or signing would be used in computing periods of procedural delay.
This created the necessity for the "effective (late" concept, which is discussed in
Comment, 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 509 (1949).
S. Two comprehensive comments deal with the problem. See Comments, 9
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 509 (1949) ; 24 TuL. L. REV. 470 (1950).
9. See Comment, 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 509 (1949).
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periods of prescription,1° and in establishing property rights in
the judgment." Since the new Code does not abolish the dis-
tinction between rendition and signing of the judgment, it is
helpful to analyze separately the methods employed by the Code
in resolving each of these problems.12
In determining the "effective date" of the judgment for the
purpose of ascertaining the delays for appealing, the Code of
Civil Procedure corrected the deficiency in the old law, not by
removing the distinction between the rendition and signing of
the judgment or stipulation an "effective date,"'1 3 but by stating
that the delays for devolutive and suspensive appeals will com-
mence on the expiration of the delay granted for the application
for new trial. 14 Such application may be made within three days,
exclusive of holidays, following the day on which the clerk mails
the notice of the signing of the judgment.15 Thus, as between
rendition and signing, the signing of the judgment is the focal
point for the determination of periods of delay. It is also note-
worthy that the legislature directed that all judgments may be
signed at any time after rendition. 6 The Law Institute contem-
plated that the judgments will be signed within a reasonable
time and granted great discretion to the courts in determining
what is reasonable. 17
The second important area where the distinction between
rendition and signing of the judgment created confusion was
that of ascertaining the commencement of the tolling of pre-
scription of money judgments under Civil Code Article 3547.18
That article formerly provided that money judgments would pre-
scribe in ten years from "rendition." However, the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in Viator v. Heintz, 9 interpreted "rendition"
to mean "signed" and held that this prescription did not begin
until signature. Since the Viator case, there has been no serious
10. See Comment, 24 TUL. L. REV. 470, 472 (1950).
11. Id. at 473.
12. It should be noted that the new Code provides a needed uniformity be-
tween the rules of practice applicable in Orleans Parish and the remainder of the
state.
13. Both alternatives were considered and rejected by the Law Institute during
the development of the Code of Civil Procedure. See LOUISIANA STATE LAW
INSTITUTE, EXPOSE DES MOTIFS No. 13, Appendix I (May 1, 1955).
14. LA. CODE OF CIvI. PROCEDURE arts. 2087(1), 2123(1) (1960).
15. Id. art. 1974.
16. Id. art. 1911.
17. Id. Comment (a).
18. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3547 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 1.
19. 201 La. 884, 10 So.2d 690 (1942).
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doubt that the signing of the judgment was the critical factor
in computing prescription under Civil Code Article 3547. The
legislature corrected the conflict without removing the distinc-
tion between rendition and signing. This was accomplished by
amending the article to state specifically that a money judgment
rendered by a trial court is prescribed by the lapse of ten years
from its signing.20 Since signature is not required in an appellate
court judgment,21 it was'not necessary to change the rule that
such judgments prescribe ten years from "rendition. '22
The last area of confusion which existed in the prior law
concerning final judgments was the determination of when
"property rights" in the judgment came into existence. This
question was of importance in the area of abatement of actions
under Article 2315 of the Civil Code. Formerly, the right of
action granted by that article was personal.28 The right was said
to have abated if the person having the right of action died
prior to the rendition of the judgment in the action.24 This rule
created a possibility of conflict as to when the judgment was
"rendered" and thus became property of the judgment creditor.2 5
The Law Institute recommended that Article 2315 be amended
to provide that the right of action was a heritable property right,
and the adoption of this amendment by the legislature resolved
the issue.26
Another aspect of the "property right" question is presented
by the confusion relative to when the judgment creditor has a
sufficient property interest in the judgment to have it recorded.
Such recordation creates a judicial mortgage upon the property
of the judgment debtor,27 but some uncertainties existed as to
20. Article 3547 was amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 1, which was part
of the legislation enacted to supplement the adoption of the new Code.
21. E.g., Thomas v. Goodwin, 120 La. 504, 45 So. 406 (1907).
22. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3547 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 80, 1L
23. For an extensive discussion of the jurisprudence and attempted legislative
reforms in this area, see Comment, 15 LouIsixzA LAW REVIEW 722 (1955).
24. Ibid.
25. This problem has never been before the courts, but under the old law the
confusion relative to the distinction between rendition and signing could certainly
lead to conflict in such a case.
26. LA. CIvIrL CODE art. 2315 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 30, J 1.
Of course, the principal problem sought to be cured by this amendment was not
one relative to judgments. The main goal was to remove the conflict between
Article 21 of the Code of Practice and the jurisprudence in abatement of action
cases. For an evaluation of the solution of this problem by the Code of Civil
Procedure, see McMahon, The Code of Civil Procedure, 21 LouisANx LAW
REVIEW 1 (1960).
27. See Comment, 24 Tim L. Rzv. 470 (1950).
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when the judgment could first be recorded.28 Article 548 of the
Code of Practice provided that the judgment became the property
of the judgment creditor upon "rendition." Despite this pro-
vision, the courts have almost uniformly held that an unsigned
judgment could not be recorded.2 9 While the jurisprudence is in-
conclusive on the question of when a "property right" arises in
the judgment,30 it appears that for most purposes there is no
"property right" until the judgment is signed.31 Since recorda-
tion of the judgment is, in effect, partial execution, and the new
Code requires that judgments must be signed prior to execution,8
it is submitted that the Law Institute recommended the retention
of the jurisprudential rule on this point.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENTS
Article 1913 of the Code of Civil Procedure introduces a com-
plete notice system into the Louisiana law governing final judg-
ments. This article retains the rule that actual service of the
notice of the signing of a final judgment is required where a
default judgment has been taken against a defendant who has
neither been personally served with citation nor made any ap-
pearance in the suit.33 However, the mailing of notices in other
cases was formerly required only where the case had been taken
under advisement by the court.34 The new Code expands this
rule by requiring the clerk to mail a notice of the signing of the
judgment in all cases, not merely those taken under advisement.
Exceptions are recognized, of course, where service of the notice
by the sheriff is required 5 and where counsel has waived the re-
quirement of mailing of notice.3 6
Conversely, with respect to notice of the rendition of an inter-
locutory order or judgment, Article 1914 of the new Code re-
28. Ibid.
29. E.g., Marchal v. Hooker, 27 La. Ann. 454 (1875).
30. See Comment, 24 TUL. L. REV. 470, 475, n. 29 (1950).
31. A possible qualification of this conclusion may be found in the cases deal.
ing with the right of the trial court to alter a judgment after rendition. The
clear limitation that the court may not alter the substance of the judgment seems
to imply that some property right exists between rendition and signing. See LA.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1951 (1960) and the Comments thereunder.
32. Id. art. 2252: "A judgment creditor may proceed with the execution of ajudgment only after the delay for a suspensive appeal therefrom has elapsed."
Since the delays for appealing only commence after signing (see page 229 supra),
it is clear that signing of the judgment is a prerequisite to its enforceability.
33. Id. art. 1913, Comment (a).
34. Id. Comment (b).
35. Ibid.
36. Id. Comment (c).
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stricts the former rule requiring notice in all cases and provides
for notice to be mailed only in those cases where it has been re-
quested.37 This will not create a hardship, however, since the
clerk is required to make a minute entry of the rendition of all
interlocutory orders and judgments, which will be readily ac-
cessible to the party who does not request written noticeA5
PARTIAL JUDGMENTS
A widely accepted rule, in both common law and civilian
jurisdictions, has been that there could be only one final judg-
ment in any case.8 9 This rule was designed to prevent a multi-
plicity of appeals from a single trial.40 However, the rules of pro-
cedure are undergoing a liberalization and one evident aspect of
the change has been the adoption of less severe rules of joinder
of parties and actions. The liberal joinder concept naturally re-
sults in injustice where the single judgment rule is strictly ap-
plied because it forces parties with an easily proven claim to
endure the hardship of awaiting final disposition of all the
claims.4 1 Heretofore, the most prominent attempt to resolve this
conflict has been made by Section 54(b) of the Federal Rules,
which went into effect in 1936.42 This rule allowed the court to
render a judgment on a particular claim at any stage of the trial
and provided that such a judgment would terminate the suit only
with respect to the claims so adjudicated. Although the courts
were cognizant of the intent of the provision, much confusion
resulted from its application.43 Most of the problems were re-
moved by the adoption of the present Rule in 1946, which clari-
fies the old rule by providing that the court may enter a final
judgment on "one or more but less than all of the claims" pre-
sented in a suit.44 Although the present rule is effective in most
cases, particularly those involving joinder of actions, it has not
been entirely satisfactory in cases involving a joinder of par-
ties.4 5 This lack of a specific rule covering the dismissal of one
or more, but not all, of the parties litigant has resulted in con-
37. Id. art. 1914.
38. Id. paragraph 1.
39. The validity of this rule in Louisiana is recognized by the Redactors of
the new Code in id. art. 1915, Comment (b).
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. For a complete history of this rule, see 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§54.01 (2d ed. 1953).
43. Id. § 54.01[6].
44. Ibid.
45. Id. § 54.01[10] (Supp. 1959).
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flicting decisions where an appeal is taken from the judgment of
dismissal.4 6 Some of the appellate courts have refused to con-
sider such judgments as final for purposes of appellate jurisdic-
tion. 47 A change to alleviate this condition in Rule 54 (b) has
been recommended but has not yet been adopted.
48
The Louisiana jurisprudence reveals some cases where the
facts clearly indicate that partial judgments were given and
appeals were allowed.4 9 However, there are other cases where a
strong factual situation was presented, only to have the court
hold that the partial judgment granted was not final for pur-
poses of appeal. 50 It is clear, therefore, that the jurisprudence
has developed no certain rules on this subject.5 1
The Law Institute undertook to establish certainty in the
law by the adoption of a specific article to govern this problem.
In addition to a detailed study of the Federal Rule 54(b), the
Institute considered the various attempts made by other jurisdic-
tions to settle this matter.5 2 The best elements of the various
statutes were combined with suggestions of the members of the
Institute to produce Article 1915. 53 This article allows a final
judgment to be rendered and signed on only a portion of the
whole case when the lower court has: (1) "dismissed the suit
as to less than all of the plaintiffs, defendants, third party plain-
tiffs, third party defendants, or intervenors," or (2) granted a
judgment on the pleadings; or (3) rendered a judgment on either
the principal or incidental demand, where the two have been
tried separately; or, finally (4) granted a motion for summary
judgment. Thus, it appears clear that most cases in which the
problem of partial judgments will arise are covered by this
article. 54 It is also noteworthy that this provision remedies the
46. Ibid.
47. See, e.g., Steiner v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 220 F.2d 105
(9th Cir. 1955).
48. 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.01[9], [10] (Supp. 1959).
49. E.g., Williams v. DeSoto Bank & Trust Co., 185 La. 888, 171 So. 66
(1936) ; State ex rel. Ikerd v. Judge, 35 La. Ann. 212 (1883).
50. E.g., Feitel v. Feitel, 169 La. 384, 125 So. 280 (1929).
51. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1915, Comment (b) (1960).
52. See LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, MATERIALS FOa COUNCIL MEETING
of Feb. 25 & 26, 1955, Appendix 1.
53. Ibid.
54. Cf. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1915(1) (1960) with the proposed
change to Federal Rule 54(b). See 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.01[9], [10],
[11] (Supp. 1959).
The evil of piecemeal appeals may be avoided by the trial court in many cases
by rendering the partial judgment, but not signing it until it signs the judgment




confusing situation found in the cases involving a joinder of
parties under the Federal Rules.
COSTS
The new Code makes no attempt to define costs with par-
ticularity. However, by recommending the retention of R.S.
13:4533,55 the Law Institute has, in effect, approved the present
system of allowing the trial courts discretion in deciding what
expenses may be recovered. This statute provides that the "costs
of the clerk, sheriff, witness' fees, costs of taking depositions
and copies of acts used on the trial, and all other costs allowed by
the court, shall be taxed as costs." (Emphasis added.) It is evi-
dent that this provision, although it enumerates some costs,
grants a great deal of latitude to the trial courts. It is submitted
that such latitude is desirable. A large body of jurisprudence
has developed which will retain its validity under the new Code. 56
Thus, new litigation concerning what expenses constitutes costs
should be avoided.
The most significant change made by the new Code in the
area of costs is found in the provision governing the parties who
may be liable for costs.57 Under the old law, Louisiana, like
most other jurisdictions, arbitrarily imposed the costs of litiga-
tion on the losing party.58 Under Article 1920, the imposition
of costs is in the discretion of the trial judge. Such a scheme
has obvious advantages in that it allows the court to consider
such important factors as the frivolity of the demand and the
necessity of the expense, as well as the nature of the cost, in
determining an equitable distribution of the burden of payment.
CONCLUSIONS
Three conclusions are apparent from the study of the chapter
of the Code of Civil Procedure which governs the rendition of
judgments. The first is that these provisions have effectively
removed the areas of confusion which existed under the old law.
A reading of the articles of this chapter will not reveal all of
the corrections, however. It is necessary, as the redactors un-
doubtedly intended, to study each provision in context--not only
55. LA. R.S. 13:4533 (1950).
56. E.g., Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 159 La. 933, 106 So. 385 (1925) ; Levy v.
Stephens, 54 So.2d 842 (La. App. 1951) ; Hamilton v. Antoine, 157 So. 795 (La.
App. 1934) ; Boagni v. Police Jury, 145 So. 781 (La. App. 1933) ; Levy v. Mc-
Williams, 13 La. App. 444, 129 So. 170 (1930).
57. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PRocEDuRE art. 1920 (1960).
58. LA. 'CODE OF PRACTICE art. 549 (1870).
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with the immediately preceding and subsequent articles- but
with every related provision. An example of this is found in
the earlier discussion in this Comment of the distinction between
renditon and signing of final judgments. The new Code does not
abolish this distinction since it is useful in matters relative to
the application for new trial, but rather it removes the prior
confusion- as to the commencement of the delays for appeals by
altering the articles concerning appeal.
Second, it is clear that the Code will greatly reduce future
procedural problems. To accomplish this end, the redactors
have not only borrowed thoroughly-tested rules from other
jurisdictions, but they also employed unambiguous language and
exhaustive comments to minimize any confusion relative to still
unlitigated matters. Perhaps the best example of this within the
purview of this Comment is the rule established for the granting
of partial judgments. The Code specifically enumerates the
cases in which partial judgments may be granted.
Last, the changes wrought by the Code of Civil Procedure
in the area of rendition of judgments, such as the introduction
of a complete notice system and the repeated grants of discre-
tion to the tiral courts, are entirely consistent with the evident
intention of the procedural reform. The Code itself announces
this intention when it enjoins the courts to construe it liberally
"and with due regard for the fact that rules of procedure im-
plement the substantive law and are not an end in themselves." 9
Jack P. Brook
Execution Sales
Prior to the adoption in 1960 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the law relative to execution of judgments was to be found in
articles of the Louisiana Code of Practice of 1870, statutes, and
cases. The new Code has compiled much of the material and, in
addition, has made several important changes. The purpose of
this Comment is to examine the law relative to execution sales
under a writ of fieri facias1 as it is under the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure and related statutes and to point out the major changes
which have been made in the former law.
59. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 5051 (1960).
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